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Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation 
is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, 
enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business 
group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital 
market. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and the financial structure allow a 
self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only 
sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms 
may prefer not to integrate. 
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In his famous essay, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that, in relatively backward coun-
tries, the productive and organizational structures diﬀer from those in established
industrial countries. Business groups are among the organizational structures that
dominate many emerging markets. They are a “[...] collection of ﬁrms bound
together in some formal and/or informal ways.” (Granovetter, 1994, p. 454).
Business groups take very diﬀerent forms, depending on the institutional and eco-
nomic conditions in which they operate. In some groups, cross shareholding is
the main characteristic, whereas in others a bank plays the central role. In Rus-
sia, for instance, business groups emerged around banks that establish common
ﬁnancial control by means of their lending practice. Thus, these groups are hybrid
organizational forms between ﬁrm and market. There is widespread evidence that
business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaﬃliated ﬁrms.
It has been conjectured that business groups can be advantageous because they
are substitutes for missing institutions (Khanna, 2000). We provide a theoretical
explanation of how business groups can act as substitutes for missing institutions
such as contract enforcement. Based on stylized facts on Russian business groups,
we study the case of vertically related ﬁrms and the involvement of an external
lender. We demonstrate that sequential investment may solve the underinvest-
ment problem resulting from ex post moral hazard. Our analysis also shows that
ﬁrms can have an incentive not to integrate but instead to form a business group
where decisions about production and investment are taken by legally independent
ﬁrms.
We use a two-period model to analyze the features of a self-enforcing contract
in a business group. A vertical chain of monopolies is considered in which the
production choice and the decision to undertake a cost-cutting investment by one
ﬁrm results in an externality for other ﬁrms. The ﬁrms decide to form a business
group with a bank that provides loans to ﬁnance cost-cutting investments and
exerts common ﬁnancial control. Each ﬁrm can invest in cutting costs. How-
ever, in the ﬁrst period, institutions are deﬁcient because contracts cannot be
enforced by law. An ex post moral hazard problem therefore exists in the case
of debt ﬁnancing as ﬁrms have an incentive to default strategically. Only in the
second period have legal institutions improved and contracts are enforceable. In a
business group, the ﬁrms are connected through the internal capital market. An
additional externality thus arises as the bank only ﬁnances projects in the second
period if the loan made in the ﬁrst period is repaid.
The ﬁrst result of our analysis is that these two externalities (created by the
cost-cutting investment and by the internal capital market) can be used to solve
the ex post moral hazard problem if investments are undertaken sequentially: con-
2sider a ﬁrm that receives credit from the bank in the ﬁrst period for a cost-cutting
investment. If this ﬁrm defaults, investment by another ﬁrm in this vertical pro-
duction chain will not be ﬁnanced by the bank in the second period. This means
that the defaulting ﬁrm does not enjoy a higher proﬁt in the second period be-
cause, in this case, the cost-cutting investment is not made by the other group
member. This gives the ﬁrm an incentive to repay in the ﬁrst period. The second
result is that it can be eﬃcient not to integrate. We show that relying on the
externalities present in a business group allows the ﬁrms to design a self-enforcing
contract that solves the ex post moral hazard problem in the ﬁrst period. Thus, a
business group can provide credit ﬁnance in the ﬁrst period. In contrast, an inte-
grated ﬁrm, in which decisions about production and investment are centralized,
does not get a loan in the ﬁrst period. The reason is that contract enforcement
possibilities are missing and that due to the integrated structure there are no
externalities that allow for a self-enforcing contract.
This paper is related to diﬀerent areas in the literature: business groups, in-
ternal capital markets, sequential investment, vertical disintegration and ex post
moral hazard. There are numerous empirical studies of business groups but only
a few theoretical contributions. The empirical studies demonstrate that the per-
formance of business groups in emerging markets is superior to that of unaﬃliated
ﬁrms (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1999, Perotti and Gelfer, 2001, Recanatini and
Ryterman, 2000). In his survey, Khanna (2000) suggests four diﬀerent ways for
improving group performance. Business groups can expropriate minority share-
holders, engage in rent-seeking, or exert market power.1 In these cases, business
groups increase their payoﬀ at the expense of other actors. Most importantly,
however, business groups can enhance eﬃciency by reducing market imperfec-
tions.2 In emerging markets, internal product, labor, and capital markets can
foster eﬃciency since outside markets function imperfectly.3
There are a few papers that study business groups in an economy with weak
institutions. In a general equilibrium model, Kali (1999) analyzes how business
networks can substitute for functioning institutions. This model shows that the
network absorbs honest agents and thereby has a negative impact on the anony-
1In a model of monopolistic competition, Feenstra, Huang and Hamilton (2003) study ﬁrms
that can integrate horizontally or vertically. They not only study the formation of business
groups but market structure in general and show that multiple equilibria can arise with either
high or low concentration.
2Therefore, an important conclusion of the survey is: “It is perhaps sensible to see groups
acting as substitutes for missing institutions, which would normally facilitate the functioning of
markets, in the economy (...).” (Khanna, 2000, p. 754) Therefore, business groups performing
this function are called “paragons” by Khanna and Yafeh (2005).
3Pyle (2002) showsthat the lack of contract enforcement together with missing credit registers
reduces the scale of commercial lending.
3mous market where transactions are insuﬃciently protected by legal institutions.
Kali (2002) models the transition from relational contracting to arms-length ex-
plicit contracting that takes place when market intermediaries and institutions
develop. In this model, business groups are used for relational contracting. The
result here is that, during the transition period when institutions work imper-
fectly, the two modes of contracting complement one another. In Ghatak and
Kali (2001), banks cannot observe a ﬁrm’s productivity type when they decide
on reﬁnancing. Information is obscured in a business group due to cross-debt
payment guarantees. The authors show that banks can oﬀer a menu of contracts
and ﬁrms will sort according to their risk characteristics. Kim (2004) studies a
bank’s decision to reﬁnance a defaulting ﬁrm. It is demonstrated that ﬁrms in
business groups are more likely to be reﬁnanced than stand-alone ﬁrms. Banks are
often members of a business group where funds are allocated through an internal
capital market.
There are several papers analyzing theoretically the eﬀects of internal capital
markets.4 Some of them emphasize the bright side of internal capital markets,
for example, that headquarters optimize the allocation of funds by reallocating
cash ﬂow across divisions (Stein, 1997).5 However, this “winner-picking” policy
also has a dark side.6 The ex ante incentive of a divisional manager may suﬀer if
he anticipates that cash ﬂow generated in this division will be reallocated by the
headquarters (Brusco and Panunzi, 2005).7 The theoretical literature on internal
capital markets hardly considers institutional imperfections that play an impor-
tant role in emerging markets. One notable exception is Almeida and Wolfenzon
(2006b) who point out the negative eﬀect of winner-picking on social welfare.
Due to better information within business groups, capital is allocated internally.
Thereby, the supply of funds for the external market decreases. Thus, projects
that are more productive than those ﬁnanced within a business group may not be
undertaken.
The choice between sequential and simultaneous investment has been studied
in an incomplete contract framework; through sequential investment, a complete
contract can be written on the investment in the second period. Smirnov and
Wait (2004a, 2004b) ﬁnd that sequential investment improves the ﬁrm’s incentive
4The ownership of business groups is often organized as a pyramidial structure. Recent
papers provide theoretical explanations for this phenomenon and empirical evidence (Almeida
and Wolfenzon, 2006a; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006).
5The reallocation of resources within a group inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ behavior on the product
market (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005).
6Moreover, power struggles and lobbying are value-destroying eﬀects of internal capital
markets.
7The redistribution of cash ﬂows may give rise to soft budget constraints. For a recent survey
see Dewatripont and Roland (2000).
4to invest in the second period but reduces its incentive to invest in the ﬁrst
period. Moreover, sequential investment delays the completion of the project.
While in their model sequential investment leads to a delay, we ﬁnd that only
sequential investment allows investment in the ﬁrst period as this can constitute
a self-enforcing contract.
In the literature, vertical disintegration often is interpreted as a commitment
device (Crémer, 1995; Graciano, 1995; Chen, 2005). In Graciano (1995), for
example, the probability that a supplier will experience a delay in the production
schedule is observable only within a ﬁrm. Hence, a buyer may renegotiate the
contract with its in-house seller if the latter experiences a delay. Anticipating this,
the seller’s incentive to deliver on time suﬀers. Through vertical disintegration
the buyer commits to terminate the project if the supplier is not able to complete
it within the original budget limits. In our model, forming a business group
is preferred to integration if its costs, which are the distortions of the output
decisions, are overcompensated by the cost-cut in the ﬁrst period. A cost-cutting
investment already in the ﬁrst period is only possible in a business group when
it solves the ex post moral hazard problem through establishing a self-enforcing
contract.
The set-up of our model is closest to the analysis by Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990). They study the ex post moral hazard problem of ﬁnancing if it is im-
possible to enforce a debt contract that is contingent on proﬁt. In a two-period
setting, the investor will reﬁnance the ﬁrm in the second period only if the ﬁrm
repays its loan in the ﬁrst period. This repayment has to be high enough to cover
the investor’s expected loss from ﬁnancing in the second period. Like Bolton
and Scharfstein, we focus on problems of contract enforcement. Therefore, we do
not factor in problems of asymmetric information between creditor and debtor.
Our analysis departs from the Bolton-Scharfstein model by incorporating sev-
eral ﬁrms. We derive the organizational structure, the sequencing of investments
and the terms of the credit contract that constitute a self-enforcing contract. In
this theoretical framework, we point out the advantage which an internal capital
market may have in an economy with imperfect institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an example of
business groups in emerging markets by describing the speciﬁc economic and in-
stitutional environment in Russia and the way business groups operate there. In
section 3, the model of a business group is presented. We characterize the or-
ganizational structure, the sequencing of investment, and the terms of the credit
contract. Both the optimal sequencing of investment and the incentive to integrate
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
52. Business Groups in Russia
In a transition country like Russia many institutions that normally support the
functioning of markets in an economy are missing. As a starting point for our
model, we describe the economic and institutional framework faced by Russian
ﬁrms and the characteristics of Russian business groups.
Russia’s industrial structure is inherited from central planning. It was, and to
a large degree still is, characterized by high vertical dependence and geographical
segmentation. Vertical dependence between ﬁrms is so strong that “each ﬁrm
in the chain may be acting as both a monopsonist and a monopolist” (Brown
et al, 1993, p. 30f). This structure was created by the industrial ministries
that thought of an economy as processes along an assembly line (Brown et al,
1993). Geographical segmentation is due to the fact that regional authorities
were responsible for planning the less important commodities. Therefore, after
planning was abandoned the markets that emerged remained local. This structure
is diﬃcult to change: the underdevelopment of the transportation system imposes
signiﬁcant barriers to trade (Broadman, 2001, Avdasheva, 2002). The credit
market shows similar characteristics. In many regions, the successor of the former
state-owned bank continues to dominate the local market (Claeys, Schoors and
Lanine, 2005).
Legal institutions in Russia are deﬁcient in many respects. Public contract
enforcement in Russia is still rather diﬃcult. There is a serious lack of juridical
infrastructure. For example, there are only one ﬁfth as many legal professionals
per capita as in western legal cultures (Blankenagel, 2000). As a result, it takes
a long time for a verdict to be made. Moreover, there are substantial costs of
going to court (Greif and Kandel, 1995). After a verdict is made, the seizure of
assets through the bailiﬀ service can take an additional several months (Kahn,
2002).8 It is therefore not surprising that many Russian ﬁrms do not rely on pub-
lic contract enforcement; among 269 ﬁrms interviewed only 55.5 per cent believe
that courts can enforce contracts (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ, 2002). Al-
ternative mechanisms have evolved to circumvent the legal system. The so-called
“integrated business group (IBG)” can be used as one example.
At ﬁrst sight, the term IBG may seem contradictory and misleading. We
therefore contrast IBGs with other organizational forms. Firms in an IBG remain
legally independent. Thus, they are not vertically integrated. However, they
cooperate more intensively than ﬁrms in “industrial networks” (Avdasheva, 2002).
One of the mechanisms that ties these ﬁrms together is common ﬁnancial control.
8Kahn (2002) argues that the bailiﬀ’s incentives for addressing cases where the value of a
claim is substantial are destroyed by the wage structure. Moreover, bailiﬀs are poorly supervised
and their endowment, e.g. with telephones and computers, is insuﬃcient.
6This may include a system of selective credit ﬁnancing (Avdasheva et al, 2000).
Dynkin and Sokolov (2002) even see the development of own ﬁnancial structures
as a particular characteristic of IBGs.
One important player in some IBGs was Incombank.9 The bank exerted com-
mon ﬁnancial control over ﬁrms. In most cases, Incombank did not hold a con-
trolling equity stake in these ﬁrms but exerted control through ﬁnancing invest-
ments (Avdasheva, 2000). For instance, Incombank was a member of “Morskaya
Tekhnika”, a Financial-Industrial-Group (FIG) which is a particular form of an
IBG (Evnevich, 2004).10 “Morskaya Tekhnika” was founded in order to construct
submarines. The main idea was that the bank can control and direct ﬁnancial
ﬂows along the whole production chain, from the exploitation of natural resources
to the sale of ﬁnal products (Zinin, 1996). Moreover, the loans granted were
supposed to improve the eﬃciency of the ﬁrms in the group (Media Monitoring
Integrum, 1996).
Perotti and Gelfer (2001) study the eﬀects on ﬁrm performance of membership
in a Financial-Industrial-Group (FIG). The authors discriminate between bank-
led and industry-led FIGs and non-group ﬁrms. They observe that there is a
negative correlation between internal ﬁnance and investment in bank-led groups.
These results suggest that there is substantial ﬁnancial reallocation in bank-led
FIGs. However, the average investment does not diﬀer substantially among the
three subgroups. Finally, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) deduce that bank-led FIGs al-
locate capital comparatively better than other ﬁrms. The sensitivity of investment
to Tobin’s Q is positive and signiﬁcant only in that subgroup. The positive eﬀect
of membership in a commercial group, such as a FIG, is conﬁrmed by a recent
study (Pyle, 2006). Pyle’s study shows that members of commercial groups in-
vest signiﬁcantly more in new technologies or new modes of production, and more
often have growing output and sales and greatly improved ﬁnancial performance,
than non-members do. An explanation for their success is that ﬁrms in FIGs have
better access to credit. For them, bank lending depends less on the predictability
of law enforcement. This result is interpreted as evidence that business groups
are substitutes for judicial enforcement of contracts (Shvets, 2006).
3. Modelo faB u s i n e s sG r o u p
3.1. Model
Our model captures the main features of the Russian economy in the following
way. We consider a two period model. In the ﬁrst period the institutions are
9However, Incombank failed after the ﬁnancial crisis in 1998.
10For a detailed analysis of FIGs see Johnson (1997).
7still imperfect. For the investor, this means that repayment cannot be enforced
by going to court. This gives rise to ex post moral hazard. In the second period,
the institutions have improved and contracts are enforceable. This is common
knowledge. Consequently, no problem of ex post moral hazard arises. To simplify
the analysis, there is no discounting.
To capture the imperfect competitive environment, we consider a model with
a chain of monopolies. The chain of monopolies reﬂects the externalities between
producers in a business group. The monopolistic producer of the intermediate
good is called manufacturer M. M produces an intermediate good at constant
marginal costs of c and sets a price pM. The retailer R, who is also a monopolist,
then faces a marginal cost for his input (the intermediate good) of pM. In addi-
tion, the retailer incurs constant marginal costs of k per unit, e.g. for servicing
customers. The retailer sets a price p. The ﬁnal demand function is D(p)=1−p.
Solving the game by backward induction, it is straightforward to show that the
manufacturer produces q =
1−c−k
4 units of the intermediate good which is sold
to the retailer at a price of pM =
1+c−k




8 . The retailer sells these goods at a price of p = 3+c+k
4 and gets
a proﬁt of ΠR =
(1−c−k)2
16 . In this standard model of a vertical structure, double
marginalization is responsible for a production level that is even lower than in the
monopoly case and, thus too low from a social welfare perspective.
Both ﬁrms can invest in order to reduce their costs and this, in turn, increases
the quantity supplied in equilibrium. If the manufacturer invests IM, its costs
decrease from cH to cL. The retailer achieves a cost cut from kH to kL if he
invests IR. Due to the vertical structure, the investment decision of M exerts an
externality on R (and vice versa). We assume that carrying out the investment
is eﬃcient in the sense that the sum of additional proﬁts generated by both ﬁrms
in both periods exceeds the costs of investment. Furthermore, we assume that
cH + kH ≤ 1.
M and R, together with other ﬁrms, some of which have excess funds, decide
to form a business group. The crucial feature of this business group is that it
has a common bank B that makes ﬁnancial decisions. B collects excess funds
and grants credit to ﬁrms within the business group that need ﬁnancing. B can
commit to ﬁnancing even if, in the short run, the repayment does not cover the
amount of credit granted.11 In our model, the bank commits in the ﬁrst period
to ﬁnance a ﬁrm in the second period even though granting the loan might yield
a loss. However, B also faces a zero-proﬁt constraint in the long run. Thus, B
establishes central ﬁnancial control. The members of the business group have
11Usually, the bank owns shares of the ﬁrms in the group. It is therefore interested in cost-
cutting investments.
8better information about each other than outsiders do. One reason could be that
they have interacted previously. To capture this idea in the simplest way we
assume that information between group members is symmetric. Due to enormous
informational asymmetries, there is no ﬁnancing from outside investors. Since
neither M nor R get credit from outside banks, B has a monopoly in ﬁnancing
them.
3.2. Ex Post Moral Hazard and Market Failure
We start by investigating the loan granted by B in a business group in a one
period framework. Suppose that B grants credit in the amount of IM to M in the
ﬁrst period when the institutions are still imperfect. M is always better oﬀ by
defaulting. As B anticipates this opportunistic behavior it does not grant credit
at all. Thus, no investment is made because the ex post moral hazard problem
cannot be solved in a one period framework (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). This
result implies that it is also impossible to ﬁnance both investments IM and IR in
the ﬁrst period.
Next, we show that credit will only be granted if a self-enforcing contract can
be designed. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible we study a model
with two periods, where functioning institutions are in place in the last period.12
In our case, a contract is self-enforcing if the sequencing of the investment decisions
is chosen appropriately.13 From the result above, it is evident that the investment
projects have to be ﬁnanced sequentially. We derive both possible sequences of
investments and check whether they solve the ex post moral hazard problem.
First, we analyze the case where investment in the ﬁrst period is undertaken by
M and in the second period by R. Second, we analyze the case where investment
is undertaken by R in the ﬁrst period and by M in the second period. In the next
section, we discuss the optimal sequencing.
12The evidence from transition countries shows that after a decade of transition, the “law
on the books” has developed much faster than law enforcement (EBRD, 2004). Thus, the
improvement in the institutional environment can be seen as a gradual development. In a
multi-period model, contract enforcement has to work only in the last period.
13An alternative solution might be that ﬁrms interact repeatedly on the product market and
punish the ﬁrm that did not repay. However, in emerging markets the uncertainty is very high
and therefore ﬁrms expect that repeated interaction with a particular partner occurs only with
a certain probability. Moreover, interaction may take place only infrequently. Therefore, it is
diﬃcult to establish a long-term relationship with reputation eﬀects.
9Proof: See the Appendix.
We assumed that R would never use equity to ﬁnance its investment IR be-
cause the proﬁt generated is too low (Assumption I1).14 However, the investment
is proﬁtable for the group due to the strong externality that IR causes for M (As-
sumption I2). According to Proposition 1, the repayment ZR
2 that B demands in
the second period cannot exceed the amount investment IR adds to the proﬁt of
R.15 Otherwise, it would hurt R’s participation constraint (PC-R). B extracts the
additional proﬁt because it exerts its monopoly power. However, this repayment
does not cover investment IR; B makes an expected loss. B grants credit only if
the loss in the second period is covered by the repayment from M in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Thus, M has to subsidize R’s investment in the second period. Proposition
2 shows when this contract is feasible.
Proposition2 .In case I, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16
￿
(1 − cL − kL)
2 − (1 − cL − kH)
2￿





2 +( 1− cL − kH)
2￿
≥ IR + IM.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The driving forces for this solution are the two externalities. First, due to the
vertical structure, R’s investment has a positive eﬀect on M’s proﬁt. As IR de-
creases R’s costs to kL, the quantity sold increases and, consequently, the proﬁts
of both R and M increase. Second, default by M results in a negative externality
on R.I f M does not repay, B does not grant credit to R in the second period
because it would make an expected loss. Accordingly, M anticipates that his de-
fault prevents R from investing in a cost-cutting technology, and that he loses the
potential increase in his own proﬁt ΠM. For the conditions given in Proposition
2, it is optimal for M to repay. Note that if (1 −cL −kL)
2 > 2(1− cL − kH)
2 and
the liquidity constraint of M is fulﬁlled, M’s incentive compatibility constraint
always holds. For this parameter constellation, R’s cost reduction has the addi-
tional eﬀect of reducing M’s incentive to default because, in the case of default,
M would not enjoy an increased proﬁt in the second period.
Lower investment expenditures increase the parameter range in which a self-
enforcing contract is feasible. However, it is important to note that IR has to
exceed a certain threshold as deﬁned in Assumption I1 and I3 respectively in
14This is also the reason R does not contribute its proﬁt generated in period 1 to reduce the
amount of credit needed in period 2.
15In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) only a proportion of the proﬁt is veriﬁable. In contrast, in
our analysis, the increase in proﬁt in the second period is contractible as institutions function
perfectly. However, the resultsgenerated in our model would still be obtained if only a proportion
of the proﬁt is contractible.
12In period 2, M’s additional proﬁt generated by the investment is insuﬃcient to
cover the costs of investment. Therefore, M would not self-ﬁnance the investment
project. The loss that B makes with this investment has to be covered by R’s
ﬁrst period repayment. Proposition 4 determines the parameter values for which
oﬀering this contract solves the ex post moral hazard problem.
Proposition 4. In case II, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16
￿
(1 − cL − kL)
2 − (1 − cH − kL)
2￿




2(1− cL − kL)
2 − (1 −cH − kL)
2￿
≥ IR + IM.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As before, the interaction of the two externalities can be exploited by B to
design a self-enforcing contract. R’s decision to repay inﬂuences M’s opportunity
to invest, and therefore increases its own proﬁt because M’s investment increases
ΠR too.16
The results in Proposition 2 and 4 show that the cost reduction in the second
period plays a crucial role. In case I, M has an incentive to repay if the cost
reduction by the second period investment IR exceeds the crucial value described
in Proposition 2. In contrast, in case II, the cost reduction by IM has to be high
enough to give R an incentive to repay. In general, the larger the cut in costs in
period 2, the higher the externality that increases the second-period proﬁt of the
ﬁrm investing in period 1. Hence, the incentive to repay in period 1 increases.
Comparing the results in the two cases reveals that the externality caused by the
second-period investment is higher in case I where R invests in period 2.
The theoretical analysis of the non-integrated business group has shown that
the externality that investment of M places on R provides an incentive for M
to repay (and vice versa). In an integrated structure, these externalities would
disappear, and with them, M’s incentive to repay. Thus, a self-enforcing con-
tract solving the ex post moral hazard problem would not be feasible in such an
organizational setting.
4. Discussion of Results
4.1. Optimal Sequencing
The arguments above have shown that the type of contract, in particular the
sequencing of investments, depends crucially on the characteristics of the projects,
16If the cost-cutting eﬀect of M’s investment is such that (1 − cL −kL)
2 > 2(1− cH − kL)
2,
R’s incentive compatibility constraint always holds, provided that R’s liquidity constraint is
fulﬁlled.
14as described by the parameter constellations. When designing a contract, three
restrictions have to be considered. They are described in general terms here. First,
proﬁts generated in both ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period must not exceed the investment
expenses in the second period (Assumption 3). Otherwise, the ﬁrms could join
forces and self-ﬁnance the second-period investment. Under these circumstances,
the ﬁrm investing in the ﬁrst period would no longer have an incentive to repay.
Hence, no credit would be granted in the ﬁrst period.
Second, the proﬁt generated in the ﬁrm which invests in the ﬁrst period has
to be high enough to cover the repayment that B needs to break even (LC). Since
the bank makes an expected loss in the second period, it must obtain a positive
proﬁt in the ﬁrst period. The bank’s second-period loss, which has to be covered
by the ﬁrm that invests in the ﬁrst period, can be interpreted as a subsidy for the
ﬁrm investing in the second period. The more the proﬁt of the ﬁrm investing in
the second period increases by second period investment, the lower the subsidy
needs to be.
Third, the ﬁrm investing in the ﬁrst period must have an incentive to repay
(IC). Generally, this ﬁrm decides either to repay, and thereby subsidize the ﬁrm
investing in the second period, or to default. The incentive compatibility con-
straint, which guarantees that the ﬁrm investing in the ﬁrst period repays its
loan, is fulﬁlled more easily if the cost-cutting eﬀect of the second period invest-
ment is higher than that in the ﬁrst period. This implies that the externality
from the second period investment is higher. Therefore, investment made in the
second period increases the proﬁt of the ﬁrm that has invested in the ﬁrst period
more strongly. Moreover, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm that invests in the second period
is higher and therefore the subsidy needed is lower. This makes the liquidity
constraint of the ﬁrm investing in the ﬁrst period less demanding too.
These arguments apply regardlessly of whether M or R invests in the ﬁrst
period. They already show a potential tension in the sequencing of investments.
When determining the sequence of investment, the business group faces the fol-
lowing trade-oﬀ. The business group wants to ensure the possibility of investing
in the ﬁrst period at all by solving the ex post moral hazard problem through the
appropriate sequencing. However, this might imply that it has to postpone the
investment that cuts costs most strongly to the second period. The trade-oﬀ is
illustrated in the following parametrized example:
Example 1. Suppose that IM = 0.0591,c H =0 .5,c L =0 .05 and IR =0 .00557,
kH =0 .5,kL =0 .2. In this case, a self-enforcing contract can be designed if R
invests in the ﬁrst period and M invests in the second period.
If M invests in the ﬁrst period and R invests in the second, the contract is
not self-enforcing. The reason is that the joint proﬁt of M and R in the ﬁrst
15period is high enough to ﬁnance IR in the second period. However, the proﬁts
generated would be higher if IM is undertaken in the ﬁrst period as the cost
reduction of ∆c =0 .45 is higher than that reached through IR which is given by
∆k =0 .3. This example shows that solving the ex post moral hazard problem may
require postponing the investment which reduces costs more strongly to the second
period. Facilitating investment in the ﬁrst period is the dominant requirement
since otherwise the cost reduction in the ﬁrst period cannot be obtained.17 Of
course, the optimal sequencing depends on the cost reductions reached relative
to the investment needed. If the cost reduction described in example 1 can be
obtained with diﬀerent investments, for example, IM = 0.098 and IR =0 .0379,
then the contract is self-enforcing if M invests in the ﬁrst period and R invests in
the second period.
4.2. Incentive to Integrate
Naturally, the question arises of why ﬁrms within the business group do not
integrate in order to reduce double marginalization and, thus, increase proﬁt. On
the one hand, vertical integration would increase the group’s output and thus
proﬁt to
(1−c−k)2
4 . On the other hand, the externalities would disappear in an
integrated structure, and with them, the incentive to repay of the ﬁrm investing
in the ﬁrst period. Thus, it is not possible to establish a self-enforcing contract
solving the ex post moral hazard problem in an integrated ﬁrm. The following
proposition describes the ﬁrm’s decision.
Proposition 5. In Case I, it is optimal for the ﬁrms to form a business group if
3(1− cL − kH)
2 − 4(1− cH −kH)
2 − (1 − cL − kL)
2 ≥ 0 provided that the con-
ditions of proposition 2 hold. Otherwise, M and R integrate.
In Case II, it is optimal for the ﬁrms to form a business group if
3(1− cH − kL)
2 −4(1− cH − kH)
2 −(1 − cL − kL)
2 ≥ 0 provided the conditions
of proposition 4 hold. Otherwise, M and R integrate.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Firms decide to integrate either if integration is more proﬁtable (as can be seen
from the conditions in proposition 5) or if it is not possible to solve the ex post
moral hazard problem through forming a business group because the conditions
given in proposition 2 and proposition 4 respectively fail to hold.18
17These countervailing eﬀects also highlight the ineﬃciency that arises if self-enforcing con-
tracts have to be used, as explicit contracts are not enforceable in this framework.
18Of course, remaining separate ﬁrms is dominated by either forming a business group or
integrating.
16When deciding about whether to integrate or not, M and R face the following
trade-oﬀ: integration deﬁnitely increases output in the second period but leads
to higher production costs in the ﬁrst period and thereby potentially to a lower
production level. The following example is used to illustrate Proposition 5.I t
shows a case in which ﬁrms do not have an incentive to integrate because the
proﬁt of the business group, denoted by ΠBG, is higher than the proﬁt of an
integrated ﬁrm, denoted by ΠI.
Example 2. Suppose that IM = 0.098,c H =0 .5,c L =0 .05 andIR =0 .0379,k H =
0.5,k L =0 .20. In this case, the proﬁt of a business group is higher than that of
an integrated ﬁrm, i.e. ΠBG =0 .09573 > ΠI =0 .09293.
The parameters are such that ﬁnancing M in the ﬁrst period and R in the
second period allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. The total proﬁt
of the business group in both periods is ΠBG =0 .09573. The amount of goods
produced is qBG
1 = 0.1125 in the ﬁrst period and qBG
2 =0 .1875 in the second
period. An integrated ﬁrm does not produce at all in the ﬁrst period, but produces
qI
2 =0 .375 in the second period. The total proﬁt of an integrated ﬁrm amounts
to ΠI =0 .09293.
For this example, the problem of poor institutions becomes evident at once.
Due to missing contract enforcement, outside creditors are reluctant to lend in
the ﬁrst period. The (social) costs of credit rationing can be substantial. In
our example, only a small amount of credit is needed to reduce manufacturing
costs dramatically. This cost reduction leads to an increase in the amount of
goods produced. Integration destroys the possibility of designing self-enforcing
contracts because it eliminates the externalities between M and R. Consequently,
an integrated ﬁrm is not able to ﬁnance a cost saving investment by M in the ﬁrst
period. It can reap the beneﬁts of lower manufacturing costs only in the second
period. Thus, the total proﬁt of an integrated ﬁrm is lower in our example.
5. Conclusion
We started this paper with the question of how business groups can substitute
for imperfect institutions, especially where it is impossible to enforce contracts.
We set up a model with vertically related ﬁrms and a bank as an external lender.
The model shows how a self-enforcing contract solves ex post moral hazard of
ﬁnance. The analysis reveals that vertically related ﬁrms do not integrate but
instead they establish common ﬁnancial control through having one bank that
ﬁnances all ﬁrms within the group.
17The ﬁrst result of our analysis is that ﬁrms in a business group can already
invest in the ﬁrst period when unaﬃliated ﬁrms or integrated ﬁrms are credit
rationed because of deﬁcient institutions. Thereby our model of common ﬁnancial
control and sequential investment provides a potential explanation for the superior
performance of business groups in Russia. They invest more in new technologies
and modes of production and, as a result, are likely to grow and improve their
ﬁnancial performance, as is shown by Pyle (2006). The second result is that
funds are reallocated within the business group. The reallocation is due to the
externalities of the vertical structure which are thereby partially internalized. As
a third result we show that ﬁrms can have an incentive not to integrate in order
to obtain a loan already in the ﬁrst period.
In emerging markets, it can take a long time for contracts to be enforced.19
However, if the self-enforcing contracts are repeated within this vertical struc-
ture until institutions that facilitate contract enforcement are in place, the moral
hazard problem can be solved in several periods. Because of this argument, the
positive eﬀect of internal capital markets should increase relative to its negative
eﬀect. However, while contracts can sustain ﬁnancial transactions between ﬁrms
that know each other, they do not help to develop new interactions (Johnson,
McMillan and Woodruﬀ, 2002).
19According to Arrow (2000, P. 13) “(...) the readjustment of institutions is an extended
process.”
186. Appendix
6.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Provided that M has cut its costs to cL, R invests in the second period only
if he is not worse oﬀ than without a credit ﬁnanced investment. Formally, his
participation constraint is










B will increase ZR
2 so that R’s participation constraint binds. B oﬀers credit if
it obtains a non-negative payoﬀ from this two-period relationship with M and R.
After inserting the optimal ZR













M = 0 (PC-B)
Solving for the ﬁrst period repayment ZM






6.2. Proof of Proposition 2
For M, it has to be optimal to repay after period 1. Formally, this is expressed
in its incentive compatibility constraint:






(1 − cL −kH)
2
8
or, after substituting ZM




(1 − cL − kL)





M’s incentive compatibility constraint also guarantees that he demands credit






Moreover, the proﬁt generated in period 1 has to be high enough to cover the
repayment ZM
1 . The liquidity constraint is given by:





1 ≥ 0 (LC-M)
or, after inserting ZM
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196.3. Proof of Proposition 4
The repayment must fulﬁll R’s incentive compatibility constraint and its liquidity
constraint. Repayment ZR
1 is incentive compatible if




















(1 − cL − kL)





This condition guarantees that R prefers the credit ﬁnanced investment to the
outside option of no investment. In either period, credit ﬁnancing is associated
with a proﬁt of ΠR
1 =
(1−cH−kL)2
16 . Moreover, R’s ﬁrst period proﬁt has to be high
enough to cover the repayment ZR
1 . Formally, R’s liquidity constraint is given by:





1 ≥ 0 (LC-R)
or, after inserting ZR
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6.4. Proof of Proposition 5





(1 − cH − kH)
2 +( 1− cL − kL)
2￿





(1 − cL − kH)
2 +( 1− cL −kL)
2￿
. Comparing these two proﬁt levels
yields the condition stated in Proposition 5. In Case II, the proﬁt of the business
group would be 3
16
￿
(1 − cH − kL)
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